Some researchers question whether
smallpox was ever truly exterminated. After WHO launched its global vaccination
campaign against variola in 1967, suspected cases
of smallpox were labeled as monkeypox.
Lancet published a report in 1972 that stated that WHO's program to eradicate smallpox
“can only be successful in the absence of a non-human reservoir for smallpox
virus.”
However, the author of the report
identified several poxviruses affecting both humans and animals, and conceded
that the monkeypox virus can cause clinical smallpox in humans.
In 1976, monkeypox antibodies in
humans were discovered in Nigeria and the Ivory Coast. The monkeypox virus was indistinguishable by laboratory
methods from the smallpox virus.
Orthopoxviruses, the genera to
which vaccinia, variola, cowpox, and monkeypox belong, have a high degree of
similarity, with a “propensity for genetic recombination.” Monkeypox and smallpox
produce exact clinical symptoms, with one insignificant difference: monkeypox
also causes swelling of the cervical and inguinal (groin) lymph nodes.
In 1979, new research indicated that several animal species, including some rodents, may
be carriers of variola-like viruses virtually identical to cowpox and monkeypox
viruses. In fact, several poxviruses from animal sources were tested and shown to behave like variola/smallpox
viruses.
Scientists are “wondering whether
the specter of smallpox might be rising form the dead, perhaps reincarnated in
its close relative monkeypox, which is alive, well, and spreading in Central
Africa.” According to Dr. Peter Jahrling of the U.S. Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious Diseases, for all practical purposes, smallpox is back.
[Radio National. “The Health Report: Monkeypox.” Australian Broadcasting
Corporation (September 1, 1997)]
Bioterrorism, Dark Winter and the
New Smallpox Vaccine
During the 1970s experimentation
with smallpox virus was conducted, and two medical researchers were even killed
in England as a result. To reduce the risk of future accidents, all remaining
known samples were moved to a CDC facility in Georgia and the State Research
Center of Virology and Biotechnology in Novosibirsk, Siberia.
Numerous deadlines came and went to
destroy the virus, with some scientists defending the need to preserve
them...“for science!”
On November 15th, 2001, in the wake
of 9/11, the Bush
administration postponed indefinitely any
decision to eliminate seed stocks of the microbe.
Even though smallpox hadn't occurred
in the U.S. since 1949, the government had stockpiled 15 million doses of the
vaccine. However, the disgusting
concoction was severely archaic:
The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, in Atlanta, has a reserve of roughly 15 million doses of smallpox
vaccine. That vaccine, which is not available to the public, was manufactured
using a method that dates from the 1700s.
The method involves infecting
calves with a related virus, vaccinia; the resulting pus is used in the making
of the vaccine. That process is considered barely acceptable for human vaccine
today.
Not only that, but the vaccine was known
to cause inflammation of the brain as well as numerous other side effects, including
smallpox itself and death. Sources:
Neff, JM., et al. “Complications of smallpox
vaccination. I. National survey in the United States, 1963. NEJM 1967;276:125–32.
Fulginiti VA., et al. “Progressive
vaccinia in immunologically deficient individuals.” Birth Defects Original
Article Series. 1968;4:129–145.
Lane, JM., et al. “Routine childhood vaccination
against smallpox reconsidered.” NEJM
1969;281:1220-4.
Lane, JM., et al. “Complications of smallpox
vaccination, 1968. National surveillance in the U.S.” NEJM 1969;281:1220-4.
Lane, JM., et al. “Deaths attributable to smallpox
vaccination, 1959 to 1966, and 1968.” JAMA
1970;212:441-4.
In 1997, four years before the 2001
terrorist attacks, the Department of Defense contracted with DynPort Vaccine
Company to produce a new smallpox vaccine. In September of 2000, one year
before the terrorist attacks, the CDC
contracted with OraVax (which
changed its name to Acambis) to produce a new smallpox vaccine.
Some researchers were puzzled by
these actions since smallpox was supposedly eradicated and authorities were
debating whether to destroy all of the remaining seed stocks of the virus.
According to Dr. Margaret Hamburg, of the Department of Health and Human
Services, “A lot of people thought this was a crazy idea, to make a new vaccine
when the disease didn't exist.”
In June 2001, before the
9/11 attacks, a team of bioterrorism specialists led by the Johns Hopkins
University Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies conducted a smallpox epidemic
exercise ominously called Dark Winter.
Within two months after the
hypothetical epidemic started, three million people were infected. Dark Winter
ended with the collapse of interstate commerce, crowds rioting in the streets,
and the nation moving towards martial law.
However, like any theoretical
exercise, conclusions are predicated on the underlying assumptions. One key
assumption was that each person with smallpox would infect at least 10 other
people and that those 10 people would each infect at least 10 more people and
so on.
But a recent study published in Emerging Infectious Diseases regards
those infection rates as grossly unrealistic. The authors of the study looked
at data from numerous smallpox outbreaks and reported that on average less than
one person was infected per infectious person.
In all outbreaks, some infected
persons did not transmit a single case of smallpox to another person. The CDC
researchers concluded “the
probability that the average transmission rate will be greater than two cannot
be demonstrated reliably.”
Even though the Dark Winter
simulation was severely flawed, Dr. Henderson, the “team leader” who also led
WHO's global effort to eradicate smallpox, concluded that the threat was real
and recommended 100 to 135 million doses.
Less than 10 days after 9/11, Dick
Cheney was shown a video of the Dark Winter simulation and urged to increase
the production of smallpox vaccine.
On October 24, 2001, President Bush
asked Congress for $509 million to develop and produce a new smallpox vaccine.
He solicited bids for the job from several pharmaceutical companies, insisting
on 300 million doses—one dose for every American—within the shortest possible
time, not to exceed one year.
The new vaccine was expected to be made from a “diploid cell substrate” (human embryo) or from animal
tissue cell cultures, including those with “tumorigenic potential.”
Ideally, it would not cause adverse
reactions, would not be dangerous to people with immune system deficiencies,
and would have the capacity to defeat genetically altered strains of variola.
But researchers provided no evidence that the new vaccine would cause fewer
adverse reactions than the old vaccine.
Furthermore, experts were very concerned about “the transmissibility of vaccinia virus from a
recently vaccinated person to a susceptible host.” In other words, some
people—no one knows how many—will develop smallpox by coming into contact with
a recently vaccinated person.
Franklin Top, a biotechnology
expert and previous commander of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research,
declared that “reactogenicity” is going to be a
problem.
Dr. Mark Buller, a virologist
specializing in safer smallpox treatments at St. Louis University, boldly
pronounced: “I would not even consider having my family vaccinated. I'm more
likely to be hit riding my bike to work than be hit by a smallpox episode in my
own life. [Stolberg, SG. “Immunization: vast uncertainty on smallpox vaccine.” New
York Times (October 19, 2001)]
Potential vaccine recipients must
also understand that scientists may never be able to create a vaccine that can
protect against mutated strains of the virus. Dozens of strains already exist.
New permutations of the variola microbe could be developed by bioterrorists
rendering a new vaccine worthless, thus subjecting recipients of the shot to
the inherent risk of serious adverse reactions without the expected benefit.
In 2002, the U.S. government tested
their existing smallpox vaccine on 200 “fit and healthy” college students.
Following vaccination, 75 had high fevers, one-third missed at least one day of
work or school, and several were put on antibiotics because their blisters
resembled a bacterial infection.
Dr. Kathy Edwards, the physician
overseeing the study, commented on the
side effects: “I can read all day about it, but
seeing it is quite impressive. The reactions we saw were really quite
remarkable.”
In late 2002, smallpox vaccination
was reinstated for U.S. military personnel. In early 2003, the program was
expanded to include civilians considered at
high risk during a smallpox outbreak (mostly healthcare and emergency service
workers).
Shortly thereafter, several
vaccinated people experienced serious adverse
reactions, including heart problems. For
example, a Maryland woman
died from a hearth attack after being
injected with the shot.
These reports compelled the CDC to release a
fact sheet on the smallpox vaccine to address
the many concerns, admitting, “There is evidence suggesting that smallpox
vaccination may cause cases of heart inflammation (myocarditis), inflammation
of the membrane covering the heart (pericarditis), and a combination of these
two problems....Heart pain (angina) and heart attack have also been reported
after smallpox vaccination.”
In 2005, the Journal of the
American Medical Association published a
study that assessed the safety of the
government's program. The study documented nearly a thousand adverse events,
including 85 hospitalizations (numerous cases of myocarditis or pericarditis),
and three deaths. The report ends by suggesting:
Additional reduction of overall
vaccinia adverse events might be achievable through study of cardiac and
dermatological risk factors, a better understanding of vaccinia host-pathogen
interaction, and development of a less reactogenic vaccinia vaccine.
In 2007, a two-year-old
and his mother were infected with “eczema
vaccinatum” after the father, a U.S. army soldier, was recently vaccinated
against smallpox.
Also in 2007, an experimental
smallpox vaccine called ACAM2000 (made by Acambis) was declared safe and
effective by the FDA, despite the fact that clinical trials
of this vaccine were halted three years
earlier when several people developed myopericarditis after receiving the new
vaccine.
According to the FDA, ACAM2000 is
“nearly as effective” as the older
smallpox vaccine, Dryvax, and poses “similar risks of serious side effects.”
As for Dryvax, the listed adverse
reactions include autoinoculation (transfer of the virus to other parts of the
body) affecting the face, nose, mouth, genitalia and rectum; infection of the
eye resulting in blindness; post-vaccinal encephalitis, encephalomyelitis,
encephalopathy, progressive vaccinia, eczema vaccinatum, Stevens-Johnson
syndrome, neurological sequelae, and death.
However, even while U.S. Homeland
Security was contemplating mandating the smallpox vaccine, not every government
official was convinced. For example, Tommy Thompson of Health and Human
Services said his department had no plans for a mandatory vaccination program,
citing horrendous side effects as the principal reason. [Neergaard, L. “Health
officials review smallpox plan.” Associated Press (October 19, 2001)]
Dr. Anthony Fauci, director of the
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, also opposed the idea,
declaring that side effects were too numerous and too severe. [Stolberg, SG.]
Many pediatricians can't
distinguish between smallpox and chickenpox, according to the results of a survey published in 2006 by Clinical Pediatrics.
Fifty-nine percent of the
responders were unable to differentiate chickenpox from smallpox, and the
majority would not accept vaccination in the absence of an outbreak and would
not recommend smallpox vaccine to their patients. Even in previously vaccinated
pediatricians, willingness to receive smallpox vaccine is poor...
Despite the well-documented
concerns about the safety of the smallpox vaccine and the threat (and loss of
civil liberties) associated with mandatory vaccines, on October 23, 2001, the
CDC unveiled new legislation, The Model State
Emergency Health Powers Act, “giving
public health officials and state governors the authority to arrest, vaccinate,
medicate, and quarantine anyone they deem either unprotected from, or a threat
to spread, infectious disease (see Section 504a—Vaccination and treatment).”
Local police and the U.S. military,
by way of the National Guard, would enforce the law. Previous laws permitting
medical, religious, or philosophical exemptions would be repealed.
In response to this legislation,
Dawn Richardson of PROVE, a vaccine awareness organization, declared:
Everyone who values our freedoms
and rights in this country needs to commit to educating family and friends
about the dangers of such an unchecked medical dictatorship.
Because there has been no research
into the biological mechanisms that predispose people to vaccine reactions and
there has been no effort to screen out these individuals, this type of action
should be condemned; it will create unfathomable human suffering and sacrifice.
[Richardson, D. “Danger: forced vaccination for all under CDC's proposal.” PROVE
newsletter (November 2, 2001)]
This legislation also exempts the
State, the police, and public health authorities from any liability. “If an
individual opposes vaccines, is force-inoculated and dies, the perpetrators
cannot be prosecuted.”
Because of the increasing number of
reported side effects, Congressman Henry Waxman was forced to state the obvious: “The president has
asked healthcare workers to volunteer to be immunized so that they can serve
society. In turn, society should help them if they are hurt when they
volunteer.”
In response to these concerns, in
2006 the U.S. government published the “final rules” to the Smallpox Vaccine
Injury Compensation Program. The goal was
to provide “benefits to public health and medical response team members and
others who are injured as a result of receiving the smallpox vaccine.”
Also, “unvaccinated individuals
injured after coming into contact with a vaccinated member of an emergency
response plan, or with a person with whom the vaccinated person had contact, or
their survivors may be eligible for the same program benefits.”
In conclusion, Neil Miller offers a
crude, but damning, summary of this alternative perspective of the history of
smallpox and the smallpox vaccine:
1
Being with unsanitary living
conditions and poor nutritional awareness. This results in regional and
self-limiting outbreaks of smallpox.
2
Conduct human experiments with
variolation—the practice of inserting viral matter from a
smallpox victim into a deliberate cut on a healthy person.
3
When this fails, conduct human
experiments with cowpox, horsepox, and horsegrease cowpox.
4
When this fails, deny it.
5
When this fails, blame it on
“spurious” cowpox, improperly administered injections, or too few puncture
marks...and recommend re-vaccination.
6
When this fails, manipulate
statistics by altering medical records and falsifying death certificates...and mandates
the smallpox vaccine.
When people refuse the shot,
vaccination rates drop, and cases of smallpox dwindle...take full credit for
eradicating the disease.
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